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El THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UONNITA TUOM, Widow of

Uaniel

~uom,

Petitioner,

Case No. 19162

vs.

DUANE HALL TRUCKING, STATE
INSURANCE FUND and INDUSTRIAL
COM11ISSION OF UTAH,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
\·/rit of Review from the Industrial Co!!lll\ission
of the State of Utah

NATURE OF THE CASE
is a review of a final order of the Industrial Col!ll1\ission

~his

of Utah denying petitioner death benefits under Utah's Worker's
Compensation Laws.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
On March 2, 1983, the Administrative Law Judge entered
'"c11d1nqs of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying petitioner's
11 ·1t1on

(R.

144).

From petitioner's Objections to the Findings

1 1ct, Conclusions of Law and Order,

""C<rns1der

(R.

Motion to Review and/or Motion

146-148), the Industrial Col'lffiission affirmed the

Order of the Administrative Law Judge bj' a Denial of Motion
Review (R. 153).

fr:ir

Plaintiff thereafter filed a Pctit1on for Writ

of Review (R. 155-157) and a \vrit of

Rl" ievJ

i:osu(·d

(P.

br1ny1•

158)

this matter before the Supreme Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants on appeal respectfully ask that the decision
of the Industrial Commission of Utah be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Daniel L. Tuom died on September 5, 1981, of multiple
injuries sustained from a truck accident on August 26, 1981, in
Coalville, Utah.

~he

accident occurred during the course of the

decedent's employment with responCl.en t Duane Hal 1 Trucking ComDany.
Petitioner filed her claim for dependent benefits on
March 12, 1982, alleging that she is the surviving and dependent
spouse of decedent (R. 2).
Petitioner entered into a common law marriage with
Daniel Tuom in Idaho and lived with him from llay, 1971 until June,
1980.
(R.

No children were born as a result of the live-in arrangemen'

142).

In early 1978, Daniel Tuom met Arlene Browning, dated he'
a few times in December 1979, and became more involved with her in
the Spring of 1980 (R. 142).

When petitioner became aware of the

seriousness of Daniel Tuom's relationship with Arlene Browning, t>c
petitioner voluntarily left her common-law husband in 0reoon on
June 13, 1980 and returned to Idaho.

In August,

1980, Dan1el

~,1c

began spending several nights a week with Arlene Browning,

an~

finally moved in with Ms. Browning and her two children on

Dece~

1980

(R.

103-105, 142-143).

Subseqentl~·

-2-

Daniel and .lrlene, v:ith

t"•

family, moved to Utah in March, 1981
of no work

(R. 96-97).

After a period

(and a short-lived employment opportunity),

Daniel

\,ce,1an working for the respondent Duane '.lall Trucking in June, 1981
IR.

96,

He continued to live with Arlene during this tine and

143).

up until his death.

According to the oetitioner, Daniel Tuom visited

her on three occassions between June 1980 and September 1981

(R. 57).

The last of these visits supposedly was in March of 1981 (R. 57).
Nevertheless, Arlene considered herself married to Daniel, and the
Administrative Law Judge found that Daniel never returned to the
petitioner

(R. 143).
Respondents disagree with one allegation made in the

Statement of Facts. of petitioner's Brief.

At pages 4 and 5,

petitioner's counsel itemizes plaintiff's living expenses, and concludes:
Mrs. Tuom's sister moved in with her to help
offset household costs. At best, this would
reduce her own (Petitioner's) requirements,
but only as long as she relied upon the
charity of her sister. (petitioner's Brief at 5).
Petitioner's own testimony at the hearing before the Administrative
Law Judge clearly indicates the petitioner did not rely on her sister
for charity

(R.

58).

After petitioner left Daniel Tuom on June 13,

1980, she immediately went to live with her mother (R. 51),
and later moved in with her sister, with whom she continued to share
an apartment at the time of the trial

(R. 51).

While petitioner lived

with her sister, the living expenses were shared equally (R. 56).
ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER IS NOT THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
OF DECEDENT.

Respondents do not refute the fact that petitioner and

-3-

conunon law marriage in Idaho.
agrees "they did have a common law marr1nge ond .
formally divorced"

(R.

\·.'(' r1..-·

nc-,'!•

14 2) .

evidence suggests this relat1onshi1• •.,;as co11tinu1nq at the t1mC'
the deceased' s death of September 5,

19 81.

Petitioner cites Schurler v.
696

Industrial Commission, 43 r.

(Utah 1935) as recognizing "the possibility that a common law

marriage, consumated in a state where such marriages are valid,
would in fact be valid in the State of Utah."
7).

(Pe ti ti oner's Brief ,.

But Schurler's dicta certainly must have contemplated possiul"

Utah recognition of such a marriage only if the couple continueo
live together in Utah.

Petitioner never lived with the rleceased

Utah, and petitioner's own testimony indicates the deceased never
contributed to petitioner's support while the deceased lived in[<
with another woman

(R. 42-43).

Furthermore, Utah should not recognize a mar i ta 1 re 1 at ioc.:
where the parties have shown by their actions that they wish to

·"~

their relationship in the same simple way they entered into c.t.
apparent mutual consent.
Roylance, 69 PAC.
dissolution of the

660

Petitioner quotes at length from Hiltcn _

(Utah 1902)

(marital)

for the proposition that "no

status can be effected simoly b" the
!Petitioner's Brief

mutual consent or agreement of the parties."
Hilton concerned a marriage consummated

unrler L'tah la\·1.

do us part."
marriages,

n

and could hardly ima(J i

nE

t ·1c

· ,n; ! u

J ,-1

ri

1-

arrangements.
marry once and stay together.

r'.
~h1:-;;

-4-

t··:,(' ,~ ;'"

r- 1

n

1 :

l t:'

:-:;,.

'

·0nt,'rn;'L:ited in Hilton; however, ti!'les have changed.

In 1900 the

marriage rate in the United States was 9.3 per 1,000 as opposed to
1

d1vorcc rate of .7 per 1,000; and in 1981, the same rates were 10.6

,,·,i

~,.

3 respective!'/.

See The World AlManac

&

Book of Facts, 1983

1'lcwspaper Enterprise Association Inc., New York), page 955.
h~s

Not only

the divorce rate increased over 750% the past 81 years, many people

are now choosing common law marriages over the fanfair of formal
marriages.

Obvious reasons for the popularity of common law marriages

include the following:

1.

They give the appearance of more independence for the

2.

Obligations between the parties are minimized, especially

in light of the trend towards smaller families and the intention of
common law marriage partners--as in the instant case (R. 143)-- not
to have any children at all;
3.

They are indicitive of the increasing acceptance of

extra marital relationships and emphasis on individual freedom in

toda:;' s society.
This court should follow cases Much more recent than
~ilton,

and allow the apparent mutual consent of the parties to

terminate common law marriages not continued within Utah.
Farrow v.

Hopkins, 453 SW 2d 785

In

(Tenn. 1970), a woman claiming to

he the widow of an employee killed in an industrial accident was
J1c111ed death benefits because the husband and wife were separated
lcncr time and, although the parties saw each other occassionally,
,i1scussed se!Jarat1on or reconciliation.
111

The Tennessee

,·,,urt fnund that "(t)he deceased did not support the wife.

- s-

She asked for no support nor expected any." Id. at 788.
facts are found in the case at bar.

~~1rnilar

And in Brezickyj v. Eastern

Railroad Builders Inc., 59 A.O. 2d S78,

197 '.lYS 2r 452

(1977), th·

New York Supreme Court, Appellant Division, denied death benefits

the purported widow claimant, even after an involuntary separation,
because the separation continued by apparent mutual consent.
Likewise, plaintiff herein and the deceased mutually
consented to continue their separation indefinitely. Petitioner
purchased a home with her sister, which purchase the petitioner
characterized as an investment (R. 56).

And, in spite of his commcc.

law marriage to petitioner, the deceased was uninhibited from
exploring extra-marital relationships in 1978, 1979, and 1980.

The

deceased later entered into a live-in arrangement with Arlene
Browning, and even took care of Arlene's children for several weeks
while she was away

(R. 143).

The petitioner and the deceased filed

separate federal tax returns beginning in 1980 (R. 53, 62) and the
deceased took out accident insurance showing Arlene as his wife (R.
128).

All actions of the deceased and the petitioner showed they

contemplated ending their common law marriage.
II.

PETITIONER IS NOT A DEPENDENT OF THE
DECEDENT BY OPI:RATION OF LAW.

The question of dependency of a surviving spouse under the
Utah Worker's Compensation Act is controlled by Utah Code Annotat•c
§

35-1-71 which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The following persons shall be presuned to be
wholly dep0ndent for support upon a deceased
employee:
(2)

For purposes of payments to be nade under

subsection (2) (b) (i) of Section 35-1-68,
a surviving husband or wife shall be
presumed to be wholly dependent upon a
spouse with whom he or she live at the time
of the employee's death.
1.C.A. §35-1-71

(2)

(1953, as amended 1979).

Petitioner charges it was manifest error of law for the
Administrative Law Judge and the entire Commission not to give cause
or effect to Section 35-1-68

(2) (b) (iv), which orovides in pertinent

part:
(b) (iv) For purposes of any dependency rletermination,
a surviving spouse of a deceased employee shall be
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a
six year period from the date of death of the employee.
u.c.A.

§

35-1-68

(2) (b) (iv)

(1953, as amended 1979).

But the dependency determination test in the above statute applies
only to surviving spouses.
12) (b) (iv)

In other words, before Section 35-1-68

can be applied to the facts of this case, it must be

clearly shown that the petitioner is the surviving spouse of the
deceased.

According the to Utah Supreme Court's decision in

Utah Apex Mining Company v. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 529, 44 PAC.
656

(1926), where a claimant is living apart from the deceased at

the time of the death, the claimant has the burden of proof to show
this dependency.

The Commission found that the deceased "provided

no support for the petitioner nor was there any indication that he
intended to provide any support for her since the time of his
soµaration"

(R.

144).

Therefore, irrespective of the surviving

5?ouse question, petitioner failed to carry her burden of dependency.
Petitioner submits that "living with" standard imposed

-7-

by

§

35-1-71

(2)'

represents a duty or restraint upon

her "freedom of action" under

Basin_I~ Ser'lic~'- y_._P~~_ic

Commission, 531 P.2d 1303, 1305

(lltc>h

197'>1, and

thcrpfor<~,

Scr·.~ 1

'i ])-)-

should apply because it is "more consistent with a liberal constrJ_
of the Worker's Compensation Act.

(See Petitioner's Brief at

Two points refute petitioner's broad interpretation of the above
authorities.

First, Basin was narrowly written to apply to the

Public Service Commission, which has no inherent regulatory powers
except "those which are expressly granted.

Id.

Pe ti ti oner

herein is not being restricted from any action, nor is she being
given an additional duty by applicantion of
§

§

35-1-71

(2)

instead

Rather, she is simply being made to prove she was

35-1-68.

dependent upon the deceased because the relationship existing

betwe~

the two at the time of the fatal accident is, at best, unclear.
Second, a liberal construction of the \lorker' s CoMpensa ti on Act siw,_
not overlook the fact that "(t) he concept of marriage under \·lorker';
Compensation Statutes is not special. but follows the ordinary domeo:.
relations law" of each State.

Gamez v.

Arizona 179, 181, 559 P.2d 1094, 1096
Workmen's Compensation Law,

§

62.21

Industrial Col'"\ffiission, 114

(1977), citing 2 Larson,

(1976).

If, as petitioner argues, an inconsistency exists
subsections 71(2)

betwee~

and 68, res,-iondents agree Jucicial construction,.-

give greater weight to the more recent and more specific pronounc'-'of the legislature.

Osuala v. Aetna Life and Casualty,

~ns

P.~~

(Utah 1980);
§§
§

4703,

5201,

5204

(3rd Edition 19431.

35-1-71 (2), not subsection 68.

-s-

:::_;uch

Subsection

construct iun
71{~)

~as

fa'''

~~endeJ

1979, as was subsection 68; therefore, the more specific pronouncement

between the two should prevail.
by

Subsection 71(2) goes beyond 68

requ1r1ng cohabitation, and thus it is the most specific.

In this

Jct1on, Commission properly overlooked the dependency presumption afforded spouses under subsection 68 because subsection 71(2) was intended
to qualify application of the former statute.

In other words, no

spousal dependency presumption can apply, under Utah law, unless the
petitioner is living with the employee at the time of the employee's
death or the surrounding circumstances indicate some consistent
economic dependency by the claimant on the deceased.

Where it is

unclear who the deceased employee was married to at the time of his
death, as here where the actions of the parties contradict the selfserving testimony of the claimant (or even question whether the
deceased was legally married at all), justice and fairness demand a
look at actual dependancy.

Otherwise, as stated in Brezickyj, supra,

"(t}o find the claimant herein eligible for death benefits is to
provide support for her, which decedent had not done" for over
fourteen months.

59 A.O. 2d at 580, 397 NYS 2d and 454.

If the

deceased employee had maintained relationships with several people,
and each of them claimed death benefits, it could be very confusing for
the Court to determine which is the real spouse without first examining
all the circumstances surrounding each relationship.
Utah Supreme Court decisions have uniforrnally deterrnined
S['ousa l dependency questions in light of all surrounding circumstances.
''"" such circumstance is whether the claiming spouse was living with the
,,,,, J,,'/c'e at the time of the accident.
'''1['Jn~'

v.

For example, in Roller Coaster

Industrial Commission, 112 Utah 532, 189 P.2d 709

-9-

(1948),

the Utah Supreme Court said depencency must be determined from all
circumstances, including the amount of any support being received
the time of the fatal injury.

Tlnd in

Cor1h1ned

~\,'tals

3-

HPrluction c

Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 247, 254, 279 P 1019, 1021

(1929),

the court set for th a test for compensation, to be determined from
of the evidence:

"(I)t must be made to appear as a fact that they

were dependent upon (the employee) at the time
injured."

J_

(the employee) was fa·

In Apex Mining, Supra, the following outstanding facts wee.

deemed controlling:
First, that the parties were living separate and
apart for a considerable period of time; second,
that the husband during that period made no
contributions whatsoever towards the support of
his wife; and third, that the wife was able to
and did support herself.
Id. at 535, 244 PAC. at 659.
These facts are present in the instant matter.

Petitioner

and the deceased had been living separate and apart for over 14
prior to the death.

moo~•

No evidence suggests the petitioner relied

on or ever received any significant or even partial support from the
deceased since the June 1980 separation.

At all times during the

deceased's absence, petitioner was able to and did support herself.
Indeed, petitioner continues to provide for her own support, and is
uninhibited from doing so.
On similar facts,

the Utah Supreme Court in Apex Mining

concluded:
The natural presumption from these facts is against
dependency.
Of course that presumption might be
overcome by proof explaining the separation and nonsupport as temporary, and indicating a mutual purpose
and intent to live together again and be supported b·
the husband.
But here the explainat1on indicates the
very contrary.
Id.
-10-

Similarly, petitioner here should be required to overcome
a presumption against dependency because no evidence suggests that
she would ever have joined the deceased after she left him, or that
she could have reasonably expected any support thereafter.

In the

alternative, if Apex Mining is no longer controlling, petitioner at
least should be required to show actual dependency.

Utah authorities

are in agreement that dependency is a question of fact for the
Commission to decide.

Thus the Commission's decision, like a jury's

verdict, is conclusive as to the facts unless no substantial evidence
supports the judgment.

The Commission's uncontroverted findings that

the petitioner was not living with the deceased at the time of the
accident, and that the petitioner was not in any way dependent upon
the deceased, lends substantial support for the Commission's conclusions.
The Administrative Court was justified in examining
dependency because certainly no proven marriage between petitioner
and the deceased existed at the time of the fatal accident.
Even though common law marriages are not recognized as
spousal relationships in Utah (Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2(3))

(1953 as

amended 1977)), the Administrative Law Judge looked to Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-71(2) to determine if the relationship that existed
between the petitioner and the deceased could by itself afford
dependancy status to the applicant.

The Industrial Col".lI!lission was

bending over backwards to avoid simply dismissing the petioner's
claim for lack of any spousal relationship, which they could have
,Jone based upon strong Utah Case law (see Schurler v. Industrial
',,nm11ss1on, supra,), persuasive public policy and the aforementioned
,~

:t1cJn 30-1-2 (3), all of which oppose any recognition of a marriage

-11-

between petitioner and the clccr>asecl ,n
give the petitioner ever
Commission examined

the

'l l '' rt 11n l

liv111':

t:u!"

!lt:.1[;.

111

1n (:ffnrt

1

t-

arrJn\11-'I:ll

,-1f

nt:J

the deceased at the time of the accident.

the

pct Ltioner

clnr:J

c>n lj' when the

petitioner was found to be living apart from the deceased,
and the deceased found to be living with another woman, did the
Commission deny benefits.
III.

PETITIONER WAS llOT CONSTRUCTIVELY
"LIVING WITH" DECEDENT AT THI: DATE OF DEATH.

Although the Utah Supreme Court has given liberal

constr~·

to the meaning of the phrase "living with" in Section 35-1-71(2) ''
Diaz v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 77, 13 I'.2d 307,

"311 119321,

the liberality ends where the wife no longer looks to the husband f:·
support.

Since petitioner no longer looked to the deceased for her

support and had not "become a public charge" in the absence of his
financial assistance. Even a liberal construction of "living with"
still defeats the peitioner's claim.

Id, 13 P. 2d at 313.

Petitioner cites Ranger Insurance Company v.
Commission,

115 Ariz. A[Jp 45,

485 P.2d 69

Industrial

(1971), as granting

death benefits to a wife even though the wife and husband were
separated, if the separation is due to the husband's misconduct.
In Ranger Insurance Co., however,

the wife attempted to return tc

her husband but was threatened with death by the husband's new
companion if she ever saw her husband aqain.

to rejoin him.

In fact, [Jetitioner testified the deceased call

more than she called hir'.l ('\.

41).

-12-

l 11n lc.-i r

111'1
it

i

i

l:_·.

r3rel·

SfJ"k . ::e

1d 11 nment

;u11~.1,

I»·t

of

ltioner made no effort to return to the deceased
to him,

the

if at all.

relationship.

These facts show an apparent

Based on Brezickyj and Farrow,

petitioner should be denied benefits not only because she

was not constructively living with the deceased at the time of
death but also because the separation continued by mutual consent.
IV.

PETITIONER WAS NOT ACTUALLY DEPENDENT
ON DECEDENT AT THE TIME OF DEATH.

The Administrative Law Judge found that the decedent "provided
no support for the applicant, nor was there any indication that he
intended to provide any support for her since the time of her
separation"

(R. 143-144).

Petitioner states in her brief that for

the Administrative Judge to have found the above, he must have
arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded her testimony at trial.
(Petitioner's Brief at 17)

Petitioner testified that her depencency

on the deceased was genuine because the decedent gave her $350.00 after
she left him, $250.00 of which was for replacing the top of
petitioner's car

(R.

41-42).

Even if this testimony was believed,

by the Administrative Judge, receiving $100.00 for the necessities
of life over 14 months cannot possibly afford dependency status to
petitioner.

And in light of petitioner's self serving testimony on

the subject, reasonable minds will certainly agree with the Admin1strative Judge that there was no indication that deceased intended
[Jrovide any support for petitioner.

i"

In Ranqer Insurance Co. v. Industrial Conmission, supra,
"· 1
1

zona llppe l lant Court said the Industrial CoMI!lission alone may

·~·n;ane

whether a witnesses testimony will impact upon the findings

fact:
!Tille determination of the credibility to be accorded
is the type of determination
testimony .
-13-

routinely made by the Commission, and an
ultimate finding of fact based upon such a
credibility determination cannot be challenged.
Id.

485 P.2d at 871.
The Utah Supreme Court is in agreement that only on

v~r

rare occassions should the Commission's findings be overruled.
Harrison v. Industrial Commission, 578 P. 2d 510, 511

Ir

(Utah 1978),

this court stated that it is "for the Industrial Commission to weigc.
the evidence before it and to determine the facts of the case."
The Harrison court added: "Our statute (35-1-85) provides that the
findings of fact by the Commission are final and shall not be
subject to review." Id. at 512.

More recent authority is found in

Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Manfredi, 631 P. 2d 888, 890

(Utah 1981),

as follows:
(T)he reviewing court's inquiry is whether the
Commission's findings are "arbirary and capricious"
or "wholly without cause" or contrary to the "one
(inevitable) conclusion from the evidence" or
without "any substantial evidence to support them."
Only then should the Commission's findings be
displaced.
(Bracketed language in original).
No substantial testimony or evidence refutes the Commissi:
findings in this case.

Unlike McGarry v.

Utah 81, 222 PAC. 592, 594

(1923),

Industrial Commission, 62

(cited in Petitioner's Brief),

petitioner was in no way deperdent upon the deceased.

No evidence

suggests that petitioner's life style changed at all following the
death of her former common law husband.

Petitioner states that tr.E

deceased was earning $700.00 per week, and therefore, he would ha
been required to pay alimony in the event of a rlivorce.
has no basis, in light of the deceased's fluctuat-1ny an•' c;,•is•·••
employment and the proven ability of the oet1t1oner to bear
living expenses.

h~r

At all times after her leavin0 the deceased,

- ] .J-

1

the

~et1tioner's

~ither

living expenses were apportioned between her and

her mother or sister

(R.

51).

For these reasons, and in

light of all evidence, the Commission's finding that petitioner was
not deµendent upon the deceased is correct.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that the Industrial
Commission properly found that the decedent provided no support to
the petitioner since the date of their separation.

Petitioner

never attempted to return to the decedent and, by her actions and
those of the deceased, the separation continued by a mutual consent.
The weight of evidence indicates at all times subsequent to
separation, petitioner and the deceased held themselves out as no
longer being married.

Therefore, petitioner was not the surviving

spouse of the deceased at the time of death.

Accordingly, the

Commission's order denying death benefits to the petitioner should
be affirmed.
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